Rethinking the Role of Index Insurance Accessing Markets for the Poor

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FARMd Zurich, Switzerland June 10, 2011

Special Thanks to GlobalAgRisk Team!

GlobalAgRisk, Inc.



• Mission

Improve access to financial services and the value chain for the rural poor through innovative approaches for transferring weather risk

- Activities
 - Research and development tied to University of Kentucky research program
 - Technical capacity building
 - Educational outreach
- Supported by
 - Multinational donors
 - Governments
 - Nongovernment organizations

- Select Country Work
 - Peru El Niño/Flood
 - Mongolia Livestock
 - Vietnam Flood/Drought
 - Indonesia Earthquakes
 - Mali Drought
 - Morocco Drought
 - Mexico Drought
 - Romania Drought
 - Ethiopia Drought

My disclosure

- GlobalAgRisk support
 - Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
 - Ford Foundation
 - Gov't of Mongolia via Swiss Trust Fund
 - UNDP
 - GiZ
 - Risk Management Agency of USDA
 - Actuary and Underwriting Reviews

State of Knowledge Reports from GlobalAgRisk

- Supported by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Innovation in Catastrophic Weather Insurance to Improve the Livelihoods of Rural Households
- March 2010
 - "Data Requirements for the Design of Weather Index Insurance."
- March 2011
 - "Market Development for Weather Index Insurance Key Considerations for Sustainability and Scale Up."
- Under Revision:
 - "Legal Considerations for Index Insurance"
- Forthcoming:
 - Bringing all of the work together in a single volume

Designing Sustainable and Scalable Weather Index Insurance Programs Is Challenging

- Products must be developed in context
 - Costly (technical support, capacity building, R&D)
 - Not easily replicable
- Basis risk
 - Tradeoff between transaction costs and basis risk
- Limited or no data to develop products
- High delivery costs
- Small transactions/Small market volume
- Nascent legal and regulatory systems

How to Improve Access to Catastrophic Weather Insurance? Our Experience Suggests . . .

- Index insurance is best suited for catastrophic and consequential losses
- Index insurance that addresses weather risk of firms that serve the poor (risk aggregators) presents a feasible avenue for market growth; build a sustainable market first and then move to micro products
- Household products must find innovative delivery mechanisms to improve product affordability and offer value to clients (insurance-linked products)
- Solutions that involve public-private partnerships must clearly delineate the role for markets and the role for government
 - Understanding cognitive failure for extreme risk can help
 - Risk layering Putting catastrophic insurance into a broader conceptual framework

Market Development Process Important — Reach Scale Quickly

- To reach scale quickly, target risk aggregators first
- Introducing products with potential for significant scale engages the interest of key stakeholders (e.g., insurer, insurance regulator, global reinsurer) to provide input and services that are appropriate for longer-term sustainability
- Pilot projects that sell a few hundred policies to small households (small insured value) are often viewed as experimental and are less likely to receive the same attention


Risk Aggregator Products Are Less Costly to Develop and Implement than Household Products

- Risk aggregator products face lower basis risk
 - Risk aggregators effectively diversify much of the idiosyncratic risks born by their clients
 - Data constraints are less binding for risk aggregator products
- It is more cost effective for the insurer to establish a partnership with a risk aggregator than to market and distribute products to small holders
- Risk aggregators are more likely to understand hedging and basis risk

Financial Services and Correlated Weather Risk

Financial services are complementary — A blend of savings, credit, and insurance is likely most effective for risk management

- Savings and credit best for small to moderate losses
- Insurance is best for catastrophic losses



El Niño Insurance for Flood Innovation in Northern Peru






Piura and other areas in the North Severely affected by 1998 El Niño



- Extreme rains (Jan Apr 1998)
 - ▶ 40x normal rainfall
- Severe floods
 - ▶ 41x normal river volume
- Widespread losses
 - Many disrupted markets
 - Agricultural production, $\downarrow 1/3$
 - Public infrastructure losses
 - Cash-flow, debt repayment problems
 - Health problems
- Total losses in Piura estimated at USD 200 million


Contract is Written Using NOAA Data




- Nino estimates are derived from satellite data, observations of buoys and readings of the temperature on the surface and at deeper levels.
- The data are publicly available monthly from NOAA (The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)
- <u>http://www.cdc.noaa.gov/Correlation/nina1.data</u>

Strong El Niño in 1982-83 and 1997-98

2 extreme events in the last 32 years



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Correlation Matrix for top 10 percentile El Niños

Correlation Matrix				
	South	North	ENSO1.	ENSO3
South	100%	90%	92%	89%
North		100%	90%	90%
ENSO1.2			100%	100%
ENSO3				100%

Using Information from Nino 3 in November

- Contract pays *Before* the disaster
- Written as a contingent claims contract
- Payout rates with a contract that starts paying at 26.5 and pays 100% at 29 degrees
 - 1997 82%
 - 1983 45%
 - 1972 24%

Example of a Payout from the 1997 Event Nino 1.2 (Nov-Dec) temperature = 26.28° C

Pago del Seguro = Monto Asegurado * Índice ENSO – Índice Dispirador Minimo Índice Disparador Maximo – Índice Dispirador Minimo

Minimum payment = 5%

The insured selects the sum insured

Sum insured = 10,000,000 Soles

1998 payment = $76\% \times 10,000,000 = 760,000$ Soles

Primary Goal:

Improve Access to and Terms of Loans

- Capacity building with
 - Financial institutions
 - Peruvian banking regulator
 - Peruvian credit rating agencies
 - Sources of social capital flows into Peruvian Institutions


Case to be made

- 1) Strengthen the resiliency of the financial institution
- 2) Financial institution can be ready to lend when the community needs capital the most post disaster

Risk Aggregator Strategy Natural Disaster Effects on Banking

- Loan portfolio Systemic repayment problems for borrowers, problems can remain for years
- Deposits Depositors withdraw funds
- Costs increase Costs of funds (e.g., Interbank loans), administrative costs
- Resulting problems
 - Liquidity
 - Profitability
 - Capital Adequacy
- Lending institutions have many ways of managing these risks (e.g., Provisions, restructuring loans, etc.)

1997–1998 El Niño Spike and Recovery



With this event every 1 in 15 years, 300 basis points must be added

Default Risk Significantly Affects Interest Rates!

$$\pi = p(1+i)L - (1+r)L \qquad i = \frac{1+r}{p} - 1$$

$$\prod - \text{Expected profits}$$

$$p - \text{Exogenous probability of non-default}$$

i – Interest rate

r – Lender's opportunity costs

L – Amount of funds loaned

Example (No default risk)Example (10% default risk)r = 10%r = 10%p = 100%p = 90%


 $i = \frac{1+0.10}{1} - 1 = 0.10$

$$i = \frac{1+0.10}{0.90} - 1 = 0.22$$


El Nino may add 300 basis points to interest rates

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Historical Pattern of Agricultural Lending in Piura 1994–2006




El Niño Reduces Capital Adequacy and the Ability to Leverage and Make Profits



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Comparison of Sum Insureds using Monte Carlo



Risk Assessment Includes Evaluating Current Risk Management Strategies

- Potential strategies for managing these risks and their costs
- Liquidity \rightarrow Hold higher portion of assets in cash
 - Effect Reduces investment in productive assets
- Profitability \rightarrow Avoid exposed regions and sectors
 - Effect Limits growth opportunities, especially for untapped markets
- Capital adequacy → Leverage a lower amount of equity to provide a "cushion" for the risk
 - Effect Limits growth

Some comments on subsidies


- The subsidy question for farmers is unavoidable
- Subsidy as a percent of premium creates bad incentives
- Requirement in a world of rent seeking
 - Separate the roles
 - Commercial vs Social



Mongolia — Massive Deaths of Animals

- Mongolia: 45 million animals at the start of 2010
- Sheep, goats, cattle and yak, horses, camel
- Value of animals = US \$2 Billion
- Some 11 million animals were lost in 2001–2002 due to *dzud* (harsh winter weather).. 9.7 million were lost in early 2010!
- Animal husbandry in Mongolia is 20+% of the GDP and over 85% of all agriculture
- Census is done every year Mortality data are available by soum (county) from 1970 onwards

Index-based Livestock Insurance — Risk Layering A New Model for Public-Private Partnerships



GCC — Social Insurance


A layer of very infrequent risk where decision makers may have a cognitive failure problem

LRI — Commercial Insurance

Offered by private companies with reinsurance from government and now a global reinsurer

If the government can't continue to pay for extreme losses, the commercial layer can continue

Climate Drivers Mater: Arctic Oscillation



Underwriting Maters

- Index insurance can indeed address many of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with traditional forms of insurance
- However, sitting sales closing dates still maters and the insured can adversely select using weather forecast information!

Scale Matters

- None of our efforts will succeed unless we design products that capture the attention of the regulator and the market from the outset
- Start with biggest risk targeted to risk aggregators
 - Rural lenders
 - Value Chain
 - Farmer Associations

Carefully move to micro products with concept of livelihoods insurance for consequential losses suffered by small households; challenges will remain for demand and delivery

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